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A TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY AS A
JUDGMENT CREDITOR
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress has been attempting to eliminate secret liens under
the bankruptcy act for years. The battle has once again been
joined over the question of whether a trustee in bankruptcy is
a judgment creditor within the meaning of section 3672 (a) of
the Internal Revenue Code. Although Congressional intent appears to clearly indicate that he is, the question has been brought
into sharp focus by several recent decisions.
In the case of In Re Green,' the United States District Court
of Alabama reviewed the certificate of Stephen B. Coleman, Referee in Bankruptcy, and held that he erred in avoiding the
United States lien for taxes established by the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 section 36702 because a trustee in bankruptcy is not
a judgment creditor within the meaning of section 3672(a) 3 of
the Code.
1 124 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Ala. 1954)
2

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3670, hereinafter cited as code, which
reads as follows:
§ 3670. Property subject to lien
"If any person liable to pay tax neglects or refuses to pay the

same after demand, the amount (including any interest, penalty, additional amount, or addition to such tax, together with
any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien
in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to
property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person."
3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3672 (a) which reads as follows:
§ 3672. Validity against mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers, and judgment creditors:
(a) Invalidity of lien without notice. Such lien shall not be
valid as against any mortgagee, pledgees, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been filed by the collector....
(1) Under State or Territorial laws. In the office in which
the filling of such notice is authorized by the law of the State
or Territory in which the property subject to the lien is situated, whenever the State or Territory has by law authorized
the filing of such notice in an office within the State or Territory; or
(2) With clerk of district court. In the office of the clerk
of the United States, district court for the judicial district in

COMMENTS
The court stated that the words judgment creditor as used in
section 3672 (a) were used in the usual, conventional sense of a
judgment of a court of record, and that if the trustee in bankruptcy is endowed with the status of a judgment creditor, it would
have to come from the provisions of section 70 (c) of the Bankruptcy
Act. 4 The court indicated that since Congress did not state in
clear and appropriate language in section 70 (c) that the trustee
was a judgment creditor and since Congress did not add trustee
in bankruptcy to the categories of persons described in the Code
section 3672 (a), Congress did not intend to make a trustee a judgment creditor within the purview of that section.
II.

INTERPRETATION OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENTION

A. By EXAMINATION Or LEGISLATIVE REPORTS
One method of determining Congressional intent is to examine the Legislative Reports. The second sentence of section

70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act 5 called the "strong-arm clause",
first appeared in the act in 1910: It was inspired by the holding
in York Manufacturing Co. v. Cassell6 that the trustee took only
the same title as that of the bankrupt, and bankruptcy was de-

clared not to operate as a judgment or attachment.

which the property subject to the lien is situated, whenever
the State or Territory has not by law authorized the filing of
such notice, in an office within the State or Territory; or
(3) With clerk of District Court of the United States for the
District of Columbia. In the office of the Clerk of the District of Columbia, if the property subject to the lien is situated in the District of Columbia.
4 11 U. S. C. § 110 (C) (1952) which reads as follows:
"The trustee may have the benefit of all defenses available
to the bankrupt as against third persons, inoluding statutes of
limitation, statutes of frauds, usury, and other personal defenses;
and a waiver of any such defense by the bankrupt after bankruptcy shall not bind the trustee. The trustee, as to all property, whether or not coming into possession or control of the
court, upon which a creditor of the bankrupt could have obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings at the date of
bankruptcy, shall be deemed vested as of such date with all
the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor then holding a
lien thereon by such proceedings, whether or not such a creditor actually exists."
5 Supra note 4.
6 201 U. S. 344 (1906).
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Congress added an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act 7 which
stated that the trustee was vested with all the rights, remedies,
and powers of a creditor holding a lien by legal or equitable proceedings, as to property coming into custody of the court, and
the rights of a judgment creditor to that property not coming
into court. 8
The draftsman wrote a note explaining the amendment stating
that the York case gave an advantage to holders of unrecorded

liens. He stated: "It is this evil and the injustice worked upon
creditors who rely upon the debtor's apparent ownership against
which the bankruptcy law has set its face."
In 1938 the "strong arm clause" of section 47 (a) (2) was re-

cast as part of section 70 (c), but the substance was not changed. 10
The "strong-arm clause" was revised again in 1950 so that the

trustee was given the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor
holding a lien by legal or equitable proceedings, as to all property

of the bankrupt whether any such creditor actually existed or
not.:"

The house report' 2 explaining the bill stated that the amendment was placed in the bill for the protection of trustees in bankruptcy giving them the position of a lien creditor with respect
to all the property, and to some extent expand the general expression of the rights, of trustees in bankruptcy.
This puts the trustee in a stronger position where under the
state law an execution creditor could not prevail against a prior
lien or transfer, even though improperly recorded, or where under state law a transferee or lienor, in spite of imperfections in
the transfer which would otherwise be fatal, can prevail over a
subsequent judgment execution creditor if the transferee has
taken prior possession. In his former capacity as judgment creditor the bankruptcy trustee would not have had superior rights to
the lien improperly recorded or an imperfect transfer. However,
in his present capacity as a creditor holding a lien by legal or
7 At this time the "strong-arm clause" of the bankruptcy act was cited
at § 47 (a) (2).
8 36 Stat. 838

(1910).

9 45 CONG. REC. 2277 (1910).
10 H. R. REP NO. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 288 (1936);
"
12

REP NO. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3435 (1937).
Public Law 461, 81st Cong. (S.88).
H. R. REP. NO. 1293, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. 4 (1949).

and H. R.

COMMENTS
equitable proceeding the trustee's title is superior. The 1952
amendment 13 merely simplified section 70 (c), clarified its meaning, and made it conform to the amended section 60 (a) .14
It is apparent then from the legislative reports that the amendment was intended to expand the trustee's powers, not contract
them, and if the 1910 amendment had given the trustee the power
of a judgment creditor and Congress intended to expand the trustee's power, then the term "judgment creditor" was intended to be
included within the bounds of the phrase "creditor holding a lien
by legal or equitable proceedings."

B. By COiVPARISON TO OTBER SECTIONS OF THE ACT
Another method of determining what Congress intended by
the words 'creditor holding a lien by legal or equitable proceedings" is to see how those words are used in other sections of the
act. It is desirable, and presumably in accord with the intention
of Congress that different parts of the statute be given similar
construction unless the context shows affirmatively that a different construction was intended. 15
The court in Sampsell v. Straub1 6 used this type of reasoning
in construing section 70 (c) of the Bankruptcy Act as applied
to the California Homestead Law and held that a trustee in
bankruptcy attained the same status as a California judgment
creditor who had voluntarily recorded his abstract of judgment.
The court found that the phrase "legal or equitable proceedings"
was used in section 3 (a) (3) and section 67 (a) (1) to include
"judgement creditors." Section 3 (a) (3) makes it an act of bankruptcy for an insolvent person to permit any creditor to obtain a
lien through legal proceedings, and not discharge it within 30
days. And section 67 (a) makes any such lien voidable if obtained
within four months before bankruptcy. Both sections are designed
to prevent creditors of the bankrupt who had no preference in
the normal course of business from later obtaining a lien by legal
proceedings.
Congress wanted to maintain equality among the general
creditors after insolvency, and under the California statute which
13 Public Law 456 (S.2234) 82d Cong. 2d Sess.
14 H. R. REP NO. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1952).
15

For situations in which such differing constructions are affirmatively
indicated see Rutledge J., concurring in Nat. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tide-

water Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 582, 604 (1949).
16 194 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1951).
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provides that a "judgment or decree becomes a lien" upon the

filing of the abstract of judgment, this policy would be violated
just as much if the general creditor should be given a lien by obtaining a judgment and recording it, as if he should get similar
preference by obtaining a judgment alone. So the only reasonable construction of the phrase "by legal or equitable proceedings" as used in these two sections is that which includes a Cali-

fornia judgment lien among liens obtained by legal proceedings,
even though to create the lien it has to be recorded.

Section 70 (c) is employed to protect general creditors of the
bankrupt against secret liens.

The trustee enjoys the rights of a

creditor who has levied attachment on the bankrupt's property
and the lien given in California to a judgment creditor who has
recorded his judgment also prevails over secret liens. So the
trustee's assertion of this status of a California judgment lienor
would be consistent with section 70 (c) of the Bankruptcy Act.
Section 70 (c) then permits the inclusive conception of liens by
legal proceedings which the policy of sections 3 (a) (3) and 67 (a)
require. The court goes on to say, if section 67' (a) included the
judgment lien and section 70 (c) did not, a judgment creditor who
actually recorded his abstract of judgment within four months
of the debtor's bankruptcy, his lien, though voidable under section 67 (a) could be preserved and asserted by the trustee for the
benefit of all creditors as a claim superior to the debtor's subsequently recorded homestead exemption. While on the other hand
if no such lien actually existed, or if it had been obtained more
than four months before bankruptcy, the trustee would have no
such power to override a tardily recorded homestead exemption,
under the rights of a hypothetical creditor given to him by section 70 (c).
Therefore, in this situation the trustee's powers under section
70 (c) measured by what a creditor might have done, would be
less than his powers measured by what some creditor actually
had one, if there had not been an intervention of bankruptcy.
This does not seem to be the intention of Congress because section
70 (c) as was pointed out in the report explaining the section is
to stop secret liens, and other impediments of the debtor's property, and give the trustee the status of a diligent general creditor.
Thus there is a good argument for consistency in the construction
7
of equivalent phrases of the Bankruptcy Act.'
By research into the general intention of Congress under
section 70 (c) of the Bankruptcy Act and by research as to what
'7

Accord, McKay v. Trusco Fin. Co., 198 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1952).

COMMENTS
the words "legal or equitable proceedings" meant in other sections of the act it is clear that Congress intended that the trustee have more power than he formerly had as a "judgment
creditor" and that the term "legal or equitable proceedings" was
intended to include within its fold the term "judgment creditor".
This reasoning is axiomatic when the judicial process that is
necessary to obtain a lien is considered.' 8
Assuming that the trustee is a judgment creditor the next
question presented is whether Congress in section 3672 (a) of
the Internal Revenue Code intended "judgment creditor" as there
used to include a trustee in bankruptcy who obtains this title
through the Bankruptcy Act.
III. TRACING SECTION 3672 (a) OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE
The forerunner .to sections 3670 and 3672 (a) provided that
if a person neglected or refused to pay any tax after demand, the
amount became a lien in favor of the United States at the time
the collector got the assessment list.19 The court in United States
v. Snyder2 0 held that the statute gave a valid binding lien even
against a bona fide purchaser for value without knowledge or
notice of the existence of such a lien. So Congress amended the
statute in 1912 and added:
...

that such lien shall not be valid as against any mort-

gagee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice of such lien
shall be filed by the collector .... 21

2 2The house report that accompanied the proposed amendment,
stated that the lien is so comprehensive that it covers all the
property of the delinquent, and a person who took title would
have to ascertain whether any person, who had owned the real
estate has ever been delinquent in the payment of taxes. It was

18 In re Calhoun Supply Co., 189 Fed. 537 (N.D. Ala. 1911).

19 20 Stat. 327, 331 (1879) which reads as follows:
"If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay
the same after demand, the amount shall be a lien in favor
of the United States from the time when the assessment-list was
received by the collector, except when otherwise provided,
until paid, with the interests, penalties, and costs that may
accrue in addition thereto, upon all property and rights to
property belonging to such person."
20 149 U.S. 210 (1893).
21 37 Stat. 1016 (1912).
22

H. R. REP. NO. 1018, 62d Cong. 2d Sess. 2 (1912).
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pointed out that this was an impossible task since the business
carried on under the Internal Revenue Code may be a great distance from the property affected by the secret lien.
In 1939 the Act was amended to include pledgees, and in 1954
section 3672 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code was transferred to
section 6323 (a) without substantial change, so the meaning of
the term "judgment creditor" as used in section 6323 (a) has not
been changed since 1912.
It has been held that the term "judgment creditor" is used in
section 3672 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code in the usual, conventional sense of a judgment of a court of record. 23 However, in
In Matter of Sport Coal Co.,2 4 the court stated that in West Virginia a chose in action owned by a corporation is subject to a
lien. To effect such a lien, it is necessary that the creditor obtain a judgment, cause a writ of execution to be issued thereon
and delivered to the executing officer. Before a creditor could
have obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings on a chose
in action, he first must have recovered a judgment. The words
"such proceedings", as used in section 70 (c) of the Bankruptcy
Act means whatever proceedings are necessary to enable the
creditor to effect a lien on the property involved. So the trustee
is vested with all the rights of a judgment creditor who has
caused execution to be issued and delivered to the proper officer.
The case was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals because the United States, before the taxpayer's bankruptcy, had
served notice of the tax lien on the taxpayer's debtor. But they
left open the question of what rights the United States would
have had if such rights were dependent upon the inchoate lien
by sections 3670 and 3672 (a) of the Inon all property created
25
ternal Revenue Code.
If the reasoning of the court in the Sport case is correct, then
if the state law includes in its proceedings a requirement that to
obtain a lien by "legal or equitable proceedings" he must first
have obtained a judgment, the trustee who became a "judgment
creditor" under section 70 (c) of the Bankruptcy Act would have
become so by fulfilling the requirements of this section. He has
United States v. England, 226 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1955). See also:
In re Taylorcraft Aviation Corp., 168 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1948). In re
Ann Arbor Brewing Co., 110 F. Supp. 111 (E. D. Mlich. 1951), where
the courts held that a trustee in Bankruptcy was not a judgment
within § 3672 (a) of the Code without discussing the point.
24 125 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. W. Va. 1954).
25 United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1955).
23
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in fact been given a judgment of a court of record as used in the
conventional sense of the word. The state court that would have
issued the judgment was merely stated to have done so by the
bankruptcy statute and if Congress has by its act in effect given
a result which ordinarily would have required court action, the
process of the court proceedings has been complied with.
IV. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The court in the principal case, In re Green, has construed the
term "judgment creditor" very narrowly, as used in section 3672
(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. They have in effect held that
the congressional intent in the bankruptcy statute to make the
trustee a "judgment creditor", is not within the meaning of this
section because, even though the congressional act includes a procedure that would entail a judgment by the court, the court itself has not acted.
The court suggested in its closing paragraphs that there are
social and economical problems presented by its holding, but that
these problems will have to be taken up before the legislature.
This statement is a conclusion based upon the reasoning of the
case, used to justify the holding. The court was not actually compelled to its decision here, as the intent of Congress is expressed
in many ways other than the literal words used in a specific act,
and since this is a civil statute the court is to apply liberal con26
struction.
A court does not always bind itself to the specific words of a
statute if the intent of Congress is indicated to be the contrary. In
Keifer & Keifer v. R. F. C.27 the court states that it is important
to give "hospitable scope" to Congressional purpose even when
meticulous words are lacking. In United States v. Hutchinson28
the court, while reviewing a penal code, stated that legislation
must not be read in a spirit of mutilating narrowness, and here
examined three statutes together to find Congressional intent.
The courts, in some cases, have even supplied words Congress
has omitted 29, or employed Congressional intent when the statute
has read to the contrary. 30 And in the case of Martin v. Robson,31
Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243 (1924).
306 U.S. 381, 391 (1939).
28 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
29 Supra note 27.
80 Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
31 65 Ill. 129 (1872).
26
27

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 39, 1960
the court determined the intention of Congress from a group of
statutes showing the Congressional trend in lawmaking when
no statute had been enacted on the specific point under consideration.
V.

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

As indicated from its reports Congress' primary intention under the Bankruptcy Act was to do away with the evil of secret
liens. The situation here presented is certainly another example
of a secret lien. The creditor has difficulty evaluating the debtor's
financial position since he usually gets his information from commercial reports or other credit information, or from the debtor's
own statements. Tax claims are usually not limited as other
debts, so solvent debtors through fraud or neglect may obtain
large tax obligations which do not appear on the books or financial statements. The tax claims often cannot be determined even
by diligence on the part of the creditor, because the claim may not
have been discovered at the time of the loan or may have been
unliquidated. Thus the creditor is acting at his peril.
If the federal government is then not required to file its tax
lien to be valid against "judgment creditors" as created by the
bankruptcy act the tax may actually amount to a tax on the
creditor, who did not incur the debt and could not even know of
its existence. A court in holding that a trustee is not a judgment
creditor within the meaning of section 3672 (a) defeats the very
purpose for which Congress adopted the Bankruptcy Act.
The 1912 amendment to the Internal Revenue Code was added
so that a person taking title was not subject to the impossible
task of ascertaining whether a person who owned real estate had
at any time been delinquent in paying his taxes. Congress felt
that it was inequitable for the statute to provide that section 3670
constitutes notice. This amendment along with the amendment
in 1939 which added pledgees to the list of exceptions, after the
courts had construed the former statutes strictly, shows that Congress was trying to relieve the burden of a harsh rule of law laid
down by section 3670.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Creditors of the bankrupt are in the same situation as
the purchaser of real estate; they are harmed inequitably by secret
liens, so they are certainly within the spirit if not the letter, of the
law Congress intended to adopt.

COMMENTS

419

Why should the court now again construe the statute strictly
in the face of the spirit of congressional intent and require Congress to again amend the act?
Duane Mehrens, '61

